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Experience leaves a trace in the nervous system through plasticity. However, the exact
meaning of the mnesic trace is poorly defined in current literature. This article provides
a historical review of the term trace in neuroscience and psychoanalysis literature, to
highlight two relevant aspects: the diachronic and the semantic dimensions. There
has been a general interest in diachrony, or a form of evolution of the trace, but its
indissociable semantic dimension remains partially disregarded. Although frequently
implied, the diachronic and semantic dimensions of the trace are rarely clearly
articulated. We situate this discussion into the classical opposition of syntax, or rules
of inscription of the trace in the nervous system, and semantics, or the content of the
trace, which takes into consideration the attempt of the human being to build coherence.
A general observation is that the study of the term trace follows trends of the thought
of the given epoch. This historical analysis also reveals the decay of the idea that the
trace is reliable to the experience. From the articulation between neurosciences and
psychoanalysis in a historical perspective, this review shows that the trend is to consider
trace as a production of the subject, resulting in a permanent rewriting in an attempt to
give meaning to the experience. This trend is becoming increasingly evident in light of
recent research in neurosciences and psychoanalysis.
Keywords: trace, diachrony, semantics, reconsolidation, syntax, reassociation, Nachträglichkeit (deferred
action), engram
INTRODUCTION
From a psychoanalytic clinical perspective, the inscription of enjoyment (jouissance in French),
or a transgressive quantity of psychic energy beyond pleasure, is much discussed: “for the being
who speaks and demands, the body fails the enjoyment inscription” (Laurent, 2016, p. 15). From
a neuroscientific or a materialistic perspective, this statement is contradicted by experimental
work carried out in the 100 years. Indeed, between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, there is an
epistemological gap, which this article aims to explore. Herewith, we focus on the definition of
the inscription of the mnesic trace from a historical review of neuroscience and psychoanalysis
literature, and from current research in each field.
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A first general observation is that the different notions of
“trace,” on both neurosciences and psychoanalysis, follow the
trends of thinking of the given epoch and this is the way in which
literature on “trace” has been organized. The first section between
empiricism and humanism, the second on cybernetics, the third
on neurosciences (that extends into today), and the last section on
phenomenology. It is not, however, a history of the philosophy
of the notion of “trace”: neither psychoanalysis, nor cybernetics
nor neurosciences are here considered as philosophical theories.
Moreover, the opposition between syntax and semantics provides
in turn a framework to group the different trends of thought:
empiricism, cybernetics provides a syntactic grasp of the trace,
given that it aims to describe the rules of inscription. Conversely,
humanism and phenomenology provide a definition of trace with
a semantic consideration.
The term “trace” is referred to by Plotinus who described it as a
passive condition produced by events. Later on, Pierre Nicole, an
empiricist philosopher close to Locke (1632–1704), used the term
“trace” to propose a theological idea of the tabula rasa: sensory
experiences leave a trace in the mind, and this is the primary
way of knowing oneself. Given that it is related to the object
and not to the perceiving subject, perception “hits” our senses.1
The trace is an impression remaining in the mind; according to
empiricists, it is related to primary qualities, or a property of the
object independent of the observer. In a subsequent second stage,
concepts produced by sensations, or secondary qualities, are built
on the basis of traces resulting from experience, but they are not
reliable knowledge, as they are less in correspondence with the
world than primary qualities.
At that time, trace was considered as passively accepted by
the subject. The construction of meaning was not involved, and
it was only considered a “pure” trace in its first inscription. As
developed below, this definition had a major influence in the
later theoretical developments. However, these defined features
of trace have been questioned since the late XIXth century; other
important considerations have contributed to understanding
memory mechanisms, which have in turn raised unresolved
issues. Indeed, two axes are recurrent in the literature: the
evolution through lifespan of the trace, or diachrony, and the
role of the semantic dimension, or the construction of meaning
by the subject. Although the presence of the latter is not always
explicit in neuroscientific work, it appears frequently whether
studies refer to human memory.
Unlike the definition proposed by empiricists (primary
and secondary qualities), current research on reconstruction
of trace reveals an innumerable quantity of possible stages
of trace, given its endless possible reassociations (Sara, 2000;
Dudai, 2012). Indeed, since 1900 with work by Müller and
Pilzecker, researchers have been interested in the interference
phenomenon, particularly retroactive interference: experiences
occurring immediately after the event may interfere in the
inscription of the experience in the nervous system. The
continuation of Müller and Pilzecker’s work gave rise to the
consolidation model, a process of stabilization of memory
1“Il est même impossible de ne pas voir ce qui frappe nos sens” it is impossible not
to see what hits our senses (our translation, Nicole, 1709 [1675], p. 87).
beginning immediately after its acquisition. Moreover, in the last
two decades, research has focused on another mode of retroactive
interference, whereby retrieved traces are susceptible to a
transient phase allowing amnesic agents or new traces to update
the behavioral expression of the memory (following animal
and human studies). This has been called the reconsolidation
model, and it is implicated in what is known as the “diachronic”
dimension of trace (Ansermet and Magistretti, 2010), on the basis
of the Saussurian distinction between synchrony and diachrony
of languages.2
Inspired by psychoanalytical praxis, the diachrony involved
in memory reconsolidation has been related to the discontinuity
between experience and its inscription through the production
of new traces resulting from trace reassociation (Alberini
et al., 2013). The trace arising from this process is then not
over-determined by the first inscription. Rather, it would be
unpredictable and favored by the openness of the plastic features
of the brain. This discontinuity is related to a form of autopoiesis
of the subject, via the creation of new traces from inaugural traces
(Ansermet et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, the diachronic dimension of the trace does
not map the reconsolidation model insofar as it is delimited
by the computational theory of mind, as defined by Pinker
(1997, p. 25): “The computational theory of mind says that
beliefs and desires are information incarnated as configurations of
symbols”. Diachrony is understood rather, in articulation with the
semantic dimension, as an overhaul of the trace given the subject’s
impossibility of processing the meaning of the trace, when there
are not symbols. Therefore, diachrony does not concern the
treatment of the information, but the process occurring when
there is not enough information; it is related to a construction
following the inaccessibility of an absolute meaning of the trace.
This semantic dimension of the trace is understood in this
paper as the imaginary transcendence of the relation between
the sign and its signification; the meaning gives the impression
that a sign can occupy an assigned place, as if the signifier and
the signified were linked. However, the relation of meaning is
arbitrary, and the sound image (the signifier) seems to make
an unambiguous reference to the object (the signified). On
the one hand, the semantic dimension of the trace implies an
integration of the experience, and on the other hand, of the social
convention. In this case, the meaning is an illusion, because the
full information of both aspects is inaccessible for the subject.
Semantics is understood here as a construction: the subject
cannot process all the environmental information (Raichle, 2010)
as well as the social network evoke other significations, that
the subject knows unknown for him. Already in 1953–1954,
Jacques Lacan underlined this polyvalence of semantics: “every
semanteme refers to the whole of the semantic system, to
the polyvalence of its usages. Moreover, for everything which
properly speaking pertains to language, in as much as it is human,
that is to say utilizable in speech, the symbol is never univocal.
Every semanteme always has several meanings” (Lacan, 1991
2“Est synchronique tout ce qui se rapporte à l’aspect statique de notre science,
diachronique tout ce qui a trait aux evolutions,” it is synchronic all that relates to
the static aspect of our science [linguistics], diachronic all that relates to evolutions
of the language (our translation, de Saussure, 1997 [1916], p. 117).
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[1953–1954], p. 248). According to Lacan, the meaning is neither
understood as intrinsic to the surrounding world, nor intrinsic
to the trace itself. It has to be created by the subject within
his social network (we restricted our research to semantics and
diachrony, although intersubjectivity deserves more attention
regarding creation of the meaning and the construction of
the trace). The meaning is neither defined as the content or
proposition, nor near to the intentionality issue, as it is not a
feature of the consciousness; on the contrary, it is a product of
the unknown. It may seem paradoxical, the meaning is built on
no enough information, but precisely, the meaning does not have
an information status.
The two dimensions of diachrony and semantics may be
related to two approaches highlighted by Goldstein (2011): the
physiological approach that determines the mechanism by which
the stimulus is represented by neurons arousal, which studies
diachrony through the reconsolidation model, and the mental
approach, which encompasses semantics through studying how
a stimulus or an experience is represented in the mind. In the
same direction, Baddeley et al. (2002) distinguishes between two
paradigms in the investigation of the human memory, the one
inspired since 1885 by Ebbinghaus’ well controlled experiments,
and the other inspired since 1883 by Galton and then by Bartlett
around 1932, who explored memory with rich and meaningful
daily tasks.
In this way, maybe due to the decline of dualistic philosophical
proposals and the general favoring of strict materialistic
approaches, which goes hand in hand with the syntactic
approaches of the brain, semantic terminology has become
almost obsolete. Nevertheless, this dimension is frequently
implicit in experimental literature. This is why in a historical
perspective we address the history of the term “trace” and focus
on these two ontological aspects of diachrony and semantics, and
on their relationship without losing sight the trends of thought
framework.
EMPIRICISM AND HUMANISM: TRACE,
MNEME, ENGRAM, MARK LEFT BY
PERCEPTION, NEURONAL ASSEMBLIES
AND DEFERRED ACTION
(Nachträglichkeit)
In recent neuroscientific literature, the notions of “trace” and
“engram” are often interchangeable (Ryan et al., 2015), namely,
“the engram is approximately equivalent to the mnesic trace”
(Tonegawa et al., 2015, p. 918). However, these two terms
have a distinct history. As mentioned above, the term “trace”
was referred to by Plotinus as a passive result of the event or
experience: “the trace [the perception] keeps of the event is
not a memory; it is a condition, something passively accepted”
(Plotinus, 2013 [263–268 AD], p. 284). Surprisingly, trace and
memory were already distinguished at the time.
Along the same lines, the empiricist Pierre Nicole used the
term “trace” to support the tabula rasa thesis: the primary way to
access knowledge is the sensory experience, which leaves a trace
in the mind. The trace is related to the object and not to the
perceiving subject, which is why he states that perception “hits”
our senses.3 It is an impression remaining in the mind, related to
primary qualities, or a property of the object independent from
the observer. The second stage of the trace is called secondary
quality, in that concepts are produced by sensations. They are
built on the basis of traces resulting from experience, which are
not reliable knowledge given that they are not a result from the
direct contact with the world.
Conversely, the term “engram” coined by Richard Semon in
1904 was derived from his “engraphic effect” that references its
Greek etymology γρα´µµα, or something in its written form. Yet,
Semon was more specific. To name a “nervous irritable tissue,”
he used the term “mneme,” instead of “trace” or “engram.” The
mneme is supposed to directly respond to perception (Semon,
1921, p. 12). Thus, on the one hand, “mneme” is the first
indication of a latent and sustainable modification of the nerve
tissue produced by a stimulus, and on the other hand “engram”
is relatively similar to the current usage in neurosciences: both
terms, “engram” and “trace,” are currently related to cerebral
plasticity and memory consolidation (Dudai et al., 2015).
Besides the “engraphy law,” in 1921 Semon described an
“ecphory law,” meaning the awakening of the engram from its
latent state (Dudai, 2002). The idea is close to what is nowadays
called memory recovery. Indeed, other theories have recently
evoked the importance of considering not only the “writing,” but
also, the “reading” of the trace, respectively, the Multiple Trace
Model and the Reconsolidation Model. These models highlight
this inextricable feature in trace theory (see below), which may be
related to diachrony in that of it hints the role of trace reactivation
in other forms taken by the trace through its expression.
Parallel to empiricism, associationism4 began with Locke,
around 1690. In this same direction, James (1910 [1890])
proposed a distinction between “primary memory” and
“secondary memory,” the latter being a duplicate of the first. This
thesis recalls the empiricists’ primary and secondary qualities,
with the difference that for this author secondary memory is
related to the fact that “the phenomena of memory are among
the simplest and most immediate consequences of the fact that
our mind is essentially an associating machine” (James, 1983
[1896], p. 123).
Associationism also influenced Sigmund Freud. Since his first
writings, he was inspired by empiricism and associationism,
yet with clinical and humanistic5 inspirations (Tauber, 2009):
“[A memory] even if it has not been abreacted, enters the great
complex of associations, it comes alongside other experiences,
3“Il est même impossible de ne pas voir ce qui frappe nos sens” it is impossible not
to see what hits our senses (our translation, Nicole, 1709 [1675], p. 87).
4Associationism groups together several philosophical proposals in which the
general idea is that the association of the mental states (perceptions, ideas)
originates mental process as thinking. More precisely for Locke, the tendency to
associate ideas informs about thinking in the human beings. It should not be
confused with “free association” (in Freud’s German freie Assoziation), a method
used in the psychoanalytical technique in which the patient is prompted to say
everything that comes into his mind.
5“[Humanism] offers an ethical point of view in which humans, residing in a
secular world, might determine their own meanings and judge their own actions in
service to a self-determined life (Tauber, 2009, p. 39).
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which may contradict it, and is subjected to rectification by other
ideas” (Freud and Breuer, 1981 [1893], p. 9). In the same period,
in the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895), he attempted
to reproduce the naturalistic point of view of his time: in a
psychophysiological perspective in this text, Freud defined the
“trace” as the result of facilitation (bahnung in German) in the
neuron contact barriers in direct quantitative response with the
quantitative energy of the stimulus. This description is in line
with current notions: in 1897, Charles Sherrington first used the
term “synapse.”
Once again likely inspired from the primary and secondary
qualities, in a famous letter sent to his friend Fliess in 1986 (Freud,
1998 [1887–1904]), Freud used the term Wahrnehmungszeichen,
sign (Zeichen) of perception (Wahrnehmungen), to specify the
first stage of the trace, which was a perception mark always
unconscious and linked to other traces by association through the
simultaneity of presentation6.
Although Freud’s theory was close to associationism, it had
his own variations. According to Freud, memory remains mostly
unconscious, so human beings are only conscious of a small
portion of their memories, which are made of traces. In “Project
for a Scientific Psychology” (Freud, 1953 [1895]), the concept
of “trace” becomes more ontological than epistemological. In
order to become conscious, the trace has to be “tamed,” says
Freud, meaning that the trace has to follow retranscriptions
and rearrangements in relation to novel circumstances. Despite
Freud’s commitments to positivism, major differences between
Freud and the empiricist tradition are drawn: if the traces are
correctly rewritten, the best way to know one’s environment
and oneself is through thinking. As such, Freud’s definition
of retranscriptions hints at the current understanding of
reassociation, an evolution of the trace associations (to other
traces) through time (Ansermet and Magistretti, 2010), but also
takes into consideration the content of the trace.
Within the same text, Freud deepens the definition of
the trace, considering the relationship between trace and
satisfaction. The subject, submitted to the pleasure principle7,
attempts to keep a minimum level of excitation. Thereafter,
the mark left by perception, or Wahrnehmungszeichen in the
Freudian terminology, becomes the juncture between language
and neuronal excitation. It aims to reach a homeostatic state,
which mitigates the arousal (for more details see Ansermet and
Magistretti, 2004).
Also in accordance to the pleasure principle, Freud defends
that consciousness may be influenced from facilitated neural
pathways related to the subject’s satisfactory past experiences
in order to rapidly decrease the excitation8. It is a general
6“We know that of the percepts [Wahrnehmungen] which act upon the system
W [consciousness-perception], we retain permanently something else as well as
the content itself. Our percepts prove also to be connected with one another in
the memory, and this is especially so if they originally occurred simultaneously
[Gleichzeitigkeit]. We call this the fact of association [Assoziation]” (Freud, 2010
[1900], p. 537).
7Faced with an external stimulus, the living organism tries to keep the arousal level
as low as possible. The pleasure principle is then an avoidance of displeasure.
8“Thus the experience of satisfaction leads to a facilitation between the two
memory-images [of the object wished-for and of the reflex movement] and the
nuclear neurons which had been cathected during the state of urgency. (No doubt,
trend toward an activation of the pathways related to past
experiences having diminished the displeasure. As such, these
facilitations maintain an important hallucinatory9 component in
consciousness, related to trace reactivation that competes with
reality, in accordance with the pleasure principle.
The psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan supports this position. In his
terms, Freud is essentially saying that the subject is “suturing a
hole” when he states that the subject builds his reality according
to the pleasure principle. That is, the subject is facing a no
inscription of the trace, namely in Freudian terms, it is a wishful
activation. This hole represents a lack of satisfaction, given that
the attempts to reach it are always compared to the inaugural
moments of satisfaction, which are related to enjoyment. For
Lacan, the secondary traces built on the basis of the inaugural
trace are indicators, or masks of the loss of satisfaction, related
to the first traces (Lacan, 2012 [1967–1968]). It is how we
understand Laurent’s statement: “for the being who speaks the
body fails the enjoyment inscription” (Laurent, 2016). In a
Lacanian psychoanalysis, one may say it is why the subject
continues to try to inscribe the trace.
The most heuristic Freud’s statements had to wait until Lacan’s
insights. But despite the delay in understanding Freud’s proposal,
it is a turning point in the evolution of the concept of trace.
Not only is the subject unable to properly represent his world,
on the basis of successive efforts to find the original trace of
satisfaction, he also participates in the construction of the trace
since the loss of the original trace. As such, the inclusion of
pleasure introduces the major role of trace content in the creation
of new traces during the subject’s lifetime, as well as the concept
of retranscriptions introduces diachrony.
Later, Freud’s writings become more psychological than
physiological. Through trace construction, the subject builds a
partially fictional history from which the subject may find a
relative freedom from original traces (Freud, 1964 [1938]). It
becomes particularly relevant in case of traumatism. This idea
highlights the efforts of the human mind in building a coherent
and meaningful representation of the world. However, it also
highlights a paradox of the trace (Ansermet et al., 2014), between
experience and construction, as a result of the trace construction
in the attempt to invest the meaning. As such, any concern about
the reliability of the perception is left behind, the mark left by the
experience is not exempt from subject perceiving.
Freud used another term related to trace. It is “deferred action”
(Nachträglichkeit in Freud’s German), which is associated this
time to the overhaul of the traumatism. According to Freud, the
traumatism has two phases, one of no inscription and another
of retroactive traumatism reconstruction or “deferred action.”
during [the actual course of] the discharge brought about by the satisfaction, the
quantity (Qn`) flows out of the memory-images as well.) Now, when the state of
urgency or wishing re-appears, the cathexis will pass also to the two memories and
will activate them. And in all probability the memory-image of the object will be
the first to experience this wishful activation. [. . .] I have no doubt that the wishful
activation will in the first instance produce something similar to a perception –
namely, a hallucination. And if this leads to the performance of the reflex action,
disappointment will inevitably follow.” (Freud, 1953 [1895], p. 381).
9The term “hallucinatory” in the Freudian theory may be understood as a large
phenomenon with gradations. Here, it is not a psychopathological sign, rather it is
close to a “flashback” or revivification episode.
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In the deferred action theory, a second scene retroactively gives
a signification of trauma to a previous scene, which could not
be associated before to other traces. Thus, deferred action is a
specific form of trace reassociation with retroactive effect over
the signifiers related to a prior traumatism. This conception is in
continuity with the idea of Wahrnehmungszeichen; the experience
leaves a mark that is not a trace because it is not linked with other
traces. The second scene is generally harmless, but acts as a cued
recall, by associative features that rekindle the first scene giving it
a traumatic signification.
In summary, the associationism contributed to a syntactic
description of the trace in that it provides an explanation
of the rules of trace inscription, and it continues to inspire
neuroscientific experimentation. Indeed, Hebb (1949)
consolidated the idea that simultaneous activation of cell
groups makes the group a “neuronal assembly”: persistent
activity in one cell promotes activation of another cell in
the same group10. More specifically, the trace is described
as an increase of connective strength among populations of
interconnected neurons occurring by repeated cell co-activation.
Hence, “neuronal assemblies” is a nowadays widely accepted
term suggesting a mechanism, or rules of inscription of the
“trace” and “engram.” Thus, this is a definition at a syntactic level
in an empiricist and associationist line.
THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF THE
TRACE WITH THE MODAL MODEL:
CONSOLIDATION, LEARNING AND
LONG TERM MEMORY
Under the influence of prevailing positivism in the late XIXth
century and until nowadays, the syntactic and physiological
trace description continued a research line leading to major
neuroscientific experimental advances. Thus, in 1900 Müller and
Pilzecker studied the role of temporal conditions in learning,
the process is termed “consolidation.” In their experiment,
participants were divided into “immediate” and “delay” groups,
and asked to learn two lists of nonsense syllables. The “delay
group” had a 6 min’ interval between memorizing the two lists.
These subjects remembered 48% of the syllables, compared with
28% in the “immediate group.” The authors concluded that
a phenomenon in which a perseverating neural process was
maintained until “a permanent memory structure was formed”
(Lewis, 1979). Their work has been inspirational and has had a
major influence on the study of memory, by strengthening the
position that memory is static once fixed.
In the same positivist direction, in the 1940s there was a
growing enthusiasm for cybernetics, the study of transmission
and processing of information (in humans, other animals or
machines, in equal measure). Thus, new terminology such as
“learning” began to appear in scientific literature as an equivalent
of “memory.” Based on Atkinson and Shiffrin’s “Modal Model”
(1968), sensory memory (SM), short-term memory (STM),
10Contrary to common belief, the phrase summarizing the Hebbian postulate “cells
that fire together wire together” is not Hebb’s, but rather Shatz’s (1992).
and long-term memory (LTM) relayed the terms “trace” and
“engram” to help exclude philosophical allusions in positivist
science. According to computational models, the nervous system
receives an input that is transformed, at first into SM, later
becoming STM, and then finally, through consolidation, LTM.
This theory is based on experiments showing the fragility and
instability of recently acquired learning in the same vein as Muller
and Pilzecker’s experiment: learning strengthens over time and
becomes more permanent. In this manner, this theory explains
why after electroconvulsive therapy or cerebral concussion the
patient may present a retrograde amnesia, and forgets recent
experiences for a few seconds or minutes preceding the shock,
without forgetting what one experienced several months or
years before the shock (Squire, 1986). Therefore, consolidation
theory underlines the neuronal and cognitive mechanisms that
fix the mnesic trace according to a temporal window, or when
transferred from STM to LTM (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968).
The term LTM is still widely used in memory theorization,
while the term STM has been replaced by working memory.
This term, credited by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), accounts
for information processing instead of a storage-restricted task
evoked by the idea of STM. Indeed, patients with STM
impairment do not show LTM impairment, therefore STM is
not always necessary for a LTM constitution. However, the idea
of processing, and consequently of levels-of-processing, (Baddeley
et al., 2002) again touches on the issue of meaning, without it
taking a main role: “Hence, if the subject merely noted the visual
characteristics of a word, for example whether it was in upper
or lower case, little learning would follow. Slightly more would
be remembered if the word were also processed acoustically
by deciding, for example, whether it rhymed with a specified
target word. By far the best recall, however, followed semantic
processing, in which the subject made a judgment about the
meaning of the word, or perhaps related it to a specified sentence,
or to his/her own experience” (Baddeley et al., 2002, p. 5).
According to empiricism, the trace is in correspondence
with the world. Similarly, according with computational theory
of mind, LTM leads to autobiographical memory formation,
and discordances between reality and memory are considered
memory mistakes. The notion of “semantic” is avoided as a
constitutive feature of the trace. Since this period, the term
“semantic” has been used for “semantic memory” which “refers to
memory for facts, including general knowledge about the world”
(Manns and Squire, 2002, p. 82). It supports the cybernetic idea of
information processing for a better adaptation, as it refers to the
correspondence between the name of objects and their properties
(Manns and Squire, 2002).
THE AGE OF NEUROSCIENCES:
MULTIPLE TRACES THEORY AND
RECONSOLIDATION
Since the 1990s, neuroscience has been considered the best way
of knowing human nature. In 1990, George Bush, the president
of the United States of America, declared the start of the “Decade
of the Brain.” Neurosciences, as if was an epistemological
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trend, took major proportions, becoming state policy in the
United States of America. In the same vein, the Human Brain
Project, aiming to allow an advance knowledge in neuroscience,
computing, and brain-related medicine, started in 2013 including
more than 20 countries. Thus, biology is the contemporaneous
place to deposit anguish, as physics had once been (Ansermet,
2009), leading to important advances in the field.
Probably because of the new status of neurosciences,
the correlation of anatomical localization and task–related–
activation is used as evidence helping to describe trace. Indeed,
the fact that traces stay temporarily in the hippocampus, and
then migrate to the prefrontal cortex in order to become a
LTM (Scoville and Milner, 1957; McClelland et al., 1995) is
considered a support to the consolidation theory. Also, because
the involvement of the hippocampus in the recovery of memories
(Scoville and Milner, 1957) and in contextual memories, the
semantic perspective returned into some researchers’ discourse
(semantic memory understood as information obtained from the
context allowing to better control the environment and adapt
the response, this studies are mainly supported by experiments
on mice). Then, in 1997, Nadel and Moscovitch proposed
the “Multiple Traces Theory,” in which “the core notion is
that episodic memory trace consists of linked ensembles of
the hippocampal complex and neo-cortical neurons and that
the hippocampal component remains a necessary part of that
ensemble as long as the memory traces are viable” (Nadel and
Moscovitch, 1997, p. 224). For these authors, the hippocampus
rapidly organizes neuronal sets for all episodic information
according to its semantic properties (Dudai et al., 2015).
According to this theory, the existence of the trace depends
on semantic assemblies involved at the time of trace reactivation,
that is, the semantic properties of the trace working as an index
for neo-cortical neurons. Thus, new coherent representations
are semantically structured oriented by the context. It is a new
turning point in neurosciences. Rather than an associationism
guided by simultaneity, it is a semantic associationism (in
this context, “semantic” indicates context similarity), as Freud
suggested with his Nachträglichkeit theory.
Over the last decade, a paradigm shift took place, extending
the “Multiple Trace Theory.” The “fixation” idea was mostly
abandoned giving rise to the reemergence of the idea
of a malleability of the trace with the “reconsolidation”
hypothesis (Dudai et al., 2015). The memory reconsolidation
model, in continuity with the “Multiple Trace Theory,”
suggests that the trace may be labile after its encoding.
Experimental work, first on mice then on humans, has shown
that several days after learning, if there is a confrontation
to a reminding cue, the trace may be disrupted by an
amnesic agent (Nader et al., 2000; Sara, 2000; Dudai, 2004;
Alberini, 2011). The most frequently used amnesic agent is
propranolol, a noradrenergic transmission blocker, whose
role in memory consolidation is well documented (McGaugh,
2013). Additionally, no change in memory is reported when
the amnesic agent is administered without the reactivation of
memory.
Thus, memory reconsolidation is a form of plasticity
with paradoxical aspects: a labile mechanism of memory
after its reactivation (Nader, 2003), a process participating
in memory stabilization (Alberini, 2005), and an increasing
the strength and longevity of memory (Alberini, 2011). This
model, still hypothetical, is at the core of an indissociable
paradox of mnemonic functioning: a mechanism contributing
to the subject’s identity and continuity, but also, a mechanism
supporting a permanent change (Alberini et al., 2013).
In laboratory environments the reconsolidation mechanisms
are described as a specific natural form easily marked by
a temporal window varying to the type and age of the
memory (Nader et al., 2000) and having molecular specificities
that differentiate it to memory consolidation (Alberini, 2005).
Although, throughout a human being’s life, there are continuous
reminder cues of previous events, permanently opening the
reconsolidation temporal window (Dudai and Eisenberg, 2004),
whereby the mechanism of reconsolidation may be considered
continuously activated in daily life (Dudai, 2012). According
to this author, there would be only two utopian ways to not
permanently reconsolidate: if the learning context is always
exactly the same, or if the internal representations do not
reactivate at all during learning (Dudai, 2012). Indeed, neither
condition is the case in human experience.
On the basis of the human experience phenomenology,
according to the Dudai’s insight, this theory hints at the
permanent semantic reconstruction of the trace, suggesting
discontinuity between the experience and its inscription through
the permanent reassociation during production of new traces
(Alberini et al., 2013; see Figure 1). Thus, there is a separation
between the subject, or the lived experience, and the factuality of
the experience.
This perspective highlights the plastic features of the human
brain that allow for permanent reactivation, reassociation and
inscription of experiences. If the trace is not over-determined
by its inscription, it is then unpredictably determined by the
plastic features of the brain. Moreover, this perspective posits
that inscriptions may evolve, giving rise to the possibility of
autopoiesis of the subject via the creation or production of new
traces from the inaugural traces (Alberini et al., 2013).
Ben-Yakov et al. (2013) conducted an experiment broadening
the scope of the semantic dimension in trace construction.
Participants watched a narrative audiovisual clip (common
daily routine scenes produced by an audiovisual production
team working with the research team) while researchers used
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Hippocampal
activation was explored by overlapping two clips (Clip_Clip vs.
Clip_Fix, Clip_Scr), and the semantic dimension was explored
by incongruence in the scrambled screen condition compared
to the two presented clips (Clip_Clip vs. Clip_Scr). Immediately
following the narrative clip (8 s in duration), one of three
experimental conditions was presented: (1) to search coherence
in a second narrative clip semantically unrelated to the first
(Clip_Clip); (2) fixation, a red cross in the middle of a gray screen
where participants fixate (Clip_Fix); (3) incongruence, a visually
scrambled clip (pixels and background noise) (Clip_Scr). Next,
memory was assessed 20 min after presentation of the narrative
movie clip. The participants were previously informed about the
memory test.
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FIGURE 1 | The geometrical forms and colors indicate the different neuronal assemblies conforming the trace or parts of it. The trace of
Perception/Experience 1 and the trace of Perception/Experience 2 may lead to a new trace, a new representation, or a combination of elements from each.
FIGURE 2 | Average of increasing activity in anterior (score z-scored data), posterior, left and right hemisphere through time. The darkest green lines
show a double peak hippocampus effect in the Clip_Clip condition as compared to single peak activation on the Clip_Fix and Clip_Scr conditions in light green. The
first peak appears while the second clip has already started (gray zone) (reproduced with the kind permission of Y. Dudai).
The results showed that following presentation of the first
clip, there was a hippocampal activation about 10 s after the
end of the clip. The authors called this brain activation that is
neither immediate nor direct response to the stimulus oﬄine
activation. Because the second clip was presented approximately
at the same time as the hippocampal activation related to the first
clip, the researchers proposed that there are two independent and
alternating brain activations, online and oﬄine (see Figure 2).
Because the activation is not in direct response to the stimulus,
the oﬄine mode may be involved in an associative process. In this
case, it may open a temporal gate of lability of old traces, as the
memory reconsolidation model posits. New traces formed during
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 734
fpsyg-08-00734 June 23, 2017 Time: 11:48 # 8
Escobar et al. Diachrony and Semantics of Trace
FIGURE 3 | On Y-axis: correct cued-recall in the test memory. On
X-axis: the clip assessed. The first clip (Clip1) of the Clip_Clip condition
showed poorer recall in the memory test than the second clip (Clip2) in the
same condition, and the clip in the Clip_Fix. The clip in the Clip_Scr condition
shows poorer recall than for the clip in the Clip_Fix condition and for the
second clip in the Clip_Clip condition (∗p < 0.05). Clip2 > Clip1 and
Clip_Fix > Clip1 show a retroactive interference caused by the alternation
between online and offline processes. Clip_Scr < Clip_Fix and
Clip_Scr < Clip2 show a retroactive interference caused by the lack of
meaning of the Clip_Scr condition (reproduced with the kind permission of Y.
Dudai).
the experience may then be structured under intrinsic activation
following new associations with old traces.
There is then a continuous complex linkage between past
and following experiences according to their semantic content
in coherence with the “Multiple Traces Theory.” In this manner,
this experiment hints at the diachronic dimension of the
trace and supports an interconnection between the effort of
building a semantically coherent autobiographical history and
reconsolidation.
As the authors predicted, the results indicated better memory
assessment of Clip 2 than for Clip 1 (see Figure 3). This is
probably due to a more active role of the subject: participants
may make an effort to find a link between the two clips and may
find it easier in the case of the second, given that they already
know what to expect. Similarly, there is a difference between
the fixation condition and the scrambled screen condition
(Clip_Scr < Clip_Fix). In our view, the failed attempt to
understand the coherence given the lack of meaning of the
scrambled screen leads to such differences. It was less disruptive
for the subjects to fixate on a cross than to be confronted with the
meaningless scrambled screen. Therefore, the fixation condition
led to better conditions favoring trace construction than the
scrambled screen. Again, the semantic dimension seems be an
important factor for the trace construction.
This experiment brings a new insight in the study of the
trace. It hints at another understanding differentiated from a
computational account: the variable is not the time of processing
meaningless information related to the memorization, but the
differential meaning of the task. In this way, the mnesic trace
may be understood by trace association and not by the time
of processing or the control and processing of information. As
such, this research explores in an ecological way the diachronic
dimension, whereby the subject may reconsider past experience
over time, and secondly, the attempts to build a meaningful
experience, or semantic dimension, as a process that is not
finalized at the end of the task.
PHENOMENOLOGY: INTRINSIC
ACTIVITY, TOP-DOWN MODELS AND
IMAGE
Another important philosophical trend is the phenomenology
from which Merleau-Ponty highlighted in the 1960s the
participation of the subject in the act of perceiving: the perceptual
object in itself is considered a secondary construction, it is already
a conceptual product of the encounter with the world and it is not
an intrinsic feature of the object by itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1968).
Thus, perception is not considered a univocal reality independent
to the observer: “The thing, the pebble, the shell, we said, do not
have the power to exist in face of and against everything; they
are only mild forces that develop their implications on condition
that favorable circumstances be assembled. But if that is so, the
identity of the thing with itself, that sort of established position of
its own, of rest in itself, that plenitude and that positivity that we
have recognized in it already exceed the experience, are already
a second interpretation of the experience” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968,
p. 161).
Phenomenology points out that the human being constantly
tries to anticipate perception in order to give a meaning to
environmental information. Based on the work by Sokoloff
et al. (1955), Raichle pointed out that the change of energy
consumption in the brain associated with task performance is
only 5% (Raichle, 2010). This underlines the importance of
studying the other 95% of the activity, where the subject is not
directly responding to the environment, but is rather generating
intrinsic activity. This evidence has led to prolific investigation of
the default mode of the brain (Buckner et al., 2008; Beaty et al.,
2016) and hints at the relatively minor role of direct experience
on overall brain activity (Qin et al., 2016).
Moreover, the quantity of information in our current
environment is enormous compared to the filtered amount of
information impoverished by the processing of our nervous
system. For example, the retina can only process around 1010
bits/second. Due to the limited quantity of efferent axons, only
approximately 6× 106 bits/second are emitted by the retina, from
which only 104 are reported to the afferent pathways (Raichle,
2010). Faced with a nearly unlimited amount of information in
the world, the nervous system can only treat a small fraction
of it; this information has then to be completed in order to
establish coherence (Ansermet and Magistretti, 2010). Thus,
more important than the quantity of environmental information
is the choice of ancient traces that in a semantic consistency
fill the blanks. Additionally, the study of the perceptive process
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concerns the anticipation process and the competition between
hallucinatory pleasant traces and reality.
The opposition between environmental information
processing and inner world construction is also reflected in
the opposition between bottom-up and top-down theories.
Bottom-up theories consider sensory information treatment
as the combination of the features of the object allowing an
objective, veridical, reconstruction of the object properties
(Engel and Singer, 2001; Engel et al., 2001). Bottom-up theories
are consistent with the empiricist’s view of the trace as an
“impression which remains in the mind” and with Semon’s
idea of the engram as a product of “nervous irritable tissue”
(Semon, 1921, p. 12). Conversely, the top-down model proposes
that previously inscribed traces shape perception; attentional
and predictive processes influence on perception through
thalamocortical networks in a determined temporal structure.
More specifically, the dynamic top-down theory proposes
that populations of neurons synchronize in a network allowing
other neuron populations to arise (Engel et al., 2001). This
mechanism may form a larger inter-areal network (on visual
recognition see Bar et al., 2006) by collateral association11 that
may be in accordance with the social context or the meaning
of the situation. Thus, there is a neuronal activation generated
intrinsically, and not only as response to the stimulus. According
to this view, the perceived object acquires a meaning that is not
only intrinsic to the object but is also linked to the perceiving
subject. Engel and Singer (2001) speculated that the mechanism
underlying the synchronization, in gamma oscillations, of neuron
populations might correspond to the reinterpretation of the item
representation.
Paradoxically, although synchronic gamma oscillations have
been experimentally related to the situation in which perception
meets expectation, they have also been related to false memories
(Buzsaki, 2006). This suggests that the predictor or expectation
component may be as important as the perceptive phenomena,
similar to the Freudian idea of a hallucinatory component
in perception and the role of the semantic dimension in the
construction of the trace.
This may be related to the Lacan’s perspective, a psychoanalyst
in interaction with phenomenological thinking. For Lacan, the
notion of memory as a set of neuronal spawning is insufficient if
it is not introduced by the notion of image (Lacan, 1988 [1953–
1954]). We understand “image” here as a representation of the
“wishful activation” in Freudian terms related to hallucination, as
presented above.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: SYNTAX
VS. SEMANTIC
This article organizes the history of trace theory in four
schematized trends of thought through terms or notions
associated to each trend of thought. For the sake of brevity
11The term “association” may not be confused with the notion of “free association.”
Rather, it is conceptually close to Freud’s definition of “memory” (1962 [1896]) as
“chains of associations”.
these terms and notions do not correspond to an exhaustive
list. Moreover, we schematized these four trends despite their
blurred edges. Thus, mneme, engram, mark left by perception
(Wahrnehmungszeichen) are related to the tension between
empiricism and humanism. The notions of consolidation,
learning and long term memory are related to cybernetics,
around the 1940s–1950s. Multiple traces theory and the memory
reconsolidation model are related to the rise of the neurosciences
era, which extends until today. Finally, the notions of intrinsic
activity, top-down models and image were related to the
phenomenological tradition. In turn, these four trends of thought
can be related, as mentioned in the “Introduction,” to two
approaches of the study of memory highlighted by Goldstein
(2011), that is, the physiological approach and the mental
approach.
It is, however, more accurate to refer this two approaches
to the study of memory to the division between structuralism
and post-structuralism. Indeed, the statement “for the being who
speaks and demands, the body fails the enjoyment inscription”
(Laurent, 2016, p. 15) mentioned in the “Introduction,” according
to the author, evokes post-structuralist thinking. Accordingly,
it can be understood as a response to the structuralist
considerations. This approach neglects the signification and the
function issue, favoring the formal organization of the structure.
Structuralists ideas aim to find universal rules of organization
allowing to explain, and, to some extent, to predict human nature.
This is also a general intention of movements aiming to
describe the trace physiology, which we relate here to Chomsky’s
syntax conceptualization, since it generalizes the generative
grammar as a formalization of rules allowing to predict the
structure of production of new sentences (Chomsky, 2006).
According to Chomsky, the human being is essentially a
syntactic animal (Chomsky, 1957); he promoted the idea that the
understanding of syntax, the inscription rules, allows us to better
understand the functioning of the brain. This theory promoted
the advent of the cognitive and neuroscientific era, and defended
the idea that the human body can be understood as a biological
machine predefined by its rules of functioning, what induce
unfortunately, to an impoverishment in the function of language
and meaning theorization.
Indeed, an important criticism to Chomsky was provided by
the philosopher Searle (1990). He offered a relevant consideration
concerning the semantic conditions of the trace with his idea of
the “Chinese room.” In this thought experiment, a person who
does not understand Chinese is in a closed room with a Chinese
textbook. This person answers questions slipped to him under the
door by people outside of the room who understand Chinese.
He answers with a certain consistency and in a way that the
people outside cannot know whether or not he speaks Chinese.
The syntax is right, the signs and the ideas match, but he does
not really understand Chinese. Hence, the understanding of a
language and its meaning exceeds correspondence between the
sign and the signified.
Searle’s argument is against the idea that consciousness is
nothing more than a computer that produces signs and meanings
of the signs (Searle, 1990). To Searle, consciousness is more than
just the result of calculation sequences; it is rather an illusion
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given by semantic laws that create an independent reality to those
who observe it and affected by the social context.
Indeed, the meaning gives the impression that a sign can
occupy the assigned place, as if the signifier and the signified
were linked: but the relation of meaning is arbitrary, the sound
image (the signifier) seems to make an unambiguous reference
to the object (the signified). This is why a differentiation is made
between syntax and semantics. There is a detachment between the
writing, reproduction of correspondences between the sign and
the signified, and the reading (or trace reactivation), in which a
creative process at work is multiplying the significations.
The syntax would then have an intrinsic impossibility to report
these multiple readings of the trace (Jacob, 2003). However,
does the writing – in every rewriting – ask the meaning to
become undifferentiated? At best, the syntax seeks to report an
effect of meaning that does not belong to it. It is what shows
the constructed nature of the trace, and why we can say that
writing is exactly what leads to the ambiguity (Laurent, 2016)
and to reinvention. Despite the answers that can be provided
from one or another trend of thought, the major question of this
article is still whether the structure (in this context the syntax
or the physiological mechanism description) may to account the
meaning effects (with its necessary references to enjoyment). In
so far that is the claim of post-structuralists, this article suggest
that the post-structuralist argue is still a highly topical issue.
From Searle’s perspective, it seems that the inscription and the
semantic dimension of the trace is far from being understood
under a solipsistic explanation of the syntactic rules of inscription
of the trace itself. His thought experiment makes the point that
understanding meaning requires social convention, but also, that
social inscription gives spoken language multiple interpretations,
broadening the semantic inscription, and in turn, participating in
the trace construction.
This does not imply that the syntactic model is solipsistic. The
discover of mirror neurons in the 1980s and 1990s introduces the
notions of empathy for example in a syntactic fashion. Indeed,
intersubjectivity is conceptualized as an achieved information
entering in the brain, being processed and used to better control
the environment. Inputs are, in this line of thought, fully
represented through the brain. Nevertheless, if according to
Searle spoken language contributes to the semantic dimension
(and it cannot be dissociated from the syntactic level touched on
by diachrony), there remains an open question about the role of
social context in forming a semantic inscription on the trace over
time.
From an ontological perspective, our conclusion from this
historical review is that the reconstructive nature of the trace,
which is permanent, is at the service of the subject’s poiesis. From
an epistemological and historical perspective, our conclusion
is that notwithstanding the important influence of empiricism
in the study of the trace, the humanistic or more ecological
or phenomenological commitments frequently nuanced the
empiricist position.
Therefore, if diachrony and semantics are intertwined, this
implies that meaning processing is never really completed,
despite the trace syntax or correct engraphy, as if rewriting
follows the meaning. The potentialities of creation seem
constantly tested by the lack of meaning to which the subject
is confronted in his life. The subject has then an active and
permanent role in the construction of the trace, giving rise to a
diachronic dimension of the trace. From this perspective, instead
of being a pure brain reaction to the environment, new trace
constitution depends on the subject’s search for meaning.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, this has clinical
implications that have already been pointed out by Lacanian
psychoanalysis, whereby the psychoanalyst “has to proceed as
if the signifier of the construction had the same value as the
analysand’s memory” (Miller, 2010, p. 8), because “what is
historical truth? It’s not the exactitude of what took place, it’s
the reorganization of what took place through the perspective of
what will be” (Miller, 2010, p. 11).
Although this discussion does not allow for a comprehensive
review of the finer details and analysis of the phenomenology
of human inscription of experience, we highlight that the rich
differences in experiences, and consequently, the rich differences
in their inscription must involve an infinite variety in the modes
of brain activity during trace inscription, particularly because
the search of meaning of each experience may be as infinite as
diachrony of the trace may be. Hence, we defend the idea that
the inscription of the trace cannot be investigated as a unitary
construct, given that the last version of meaning is not accessible.
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